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RESPONSE
Making Litigating Citizenship More
Fair
Ming H. Chen
In Litigating Citizenship, Cassandra Burke Robertson and Irina
D. Manta chart the contours of expanding immigration enforcement in
the Trump administration: from criminal aliens and illegal aliens, to
legal immigrants, to naturalized citizens.1 In their own words, their
interest is “How do we determine when a particular individual meets—
or fails to meet—the legal requirements that determine citizenship
under our laws?”2 More specifically, they want to assess whether the
government’s determinations are fair. Their focus on challenges to
citizenship is a much-needed spotlight on the excesses of modern
immigration policy and their effect on our democracy.
Their Article includes great examples of how citizenship
challenges arise on a daily basis.3 Recent episodes of citizenship


University of Colorado Law School Associate Professor and Faculty-Director Immigration
and Citizenship Law Program. Author of Pursuing Citizenship in the Enforcement Era (Stanford
University Press, forthcoming 2020).
1. Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, Litigating Citizenship, 73 VAND. L. REV.
757 (2020).
2. Id. at 760.
3. Id. at 767–81.
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determination disputes at the border,4 denaturalization task forces,5
and wrongful deportation6 are richly detailed and placed in historical
context. Beyond the in-depth description that brings to life the concept
of citizenship challenges, the Article includes an extended reflection on
due process and the need for fairness in government advances of
individual rights.7 The authors emphasize the procedural safeguards
that need to be placed on the U.S. government to balance out its
immense power over comparatively weaker individuals because of the
distinctive nature of citizenship contests.8 Citing Justice Felix
Frankfurter’s words, “The history of liberty has largely been the history
of observance of procedural safeguards.”9
Due process is a well-chosen vehicle for examining fairness in
immigration proceedings. The history of immigration law has been a
struggle to secure “procedural safeguards” for immigrants, often
directed at recognizing the stakes of noncitizens living inside U.S.
borders. As those in the world of immigration law know, pushing for
due process is how immigration lawyers get things done. That is
because long traditions of sovereignty, plenary power, and deference to
executive discretion leave little opportunity for litigating the substance
of immigration policies,10 notwithstanding recent litigation focusing on
4. The range of passport denials at the border include news stories and litigation from the
last year. See, e.g., Esqueda v. Pompeo, ACLU MINN. (last visited Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.aclumn.org/en/cases/esqueda-v-pompeo [https://perma.cc/6FXU-MHRL]; Dara Lind, Trump’s
Stripping of Passports from Some Texas Latinos, Explained, VOX (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/30/17800410/trump-passport-birth-certificate-hispanic-denialcitizens [https://perma.cc/LZ9Z-LMHD]; Kevin Sieff, U.S. Is Denying Passports to Americans Along
the Border, Throwing Their Citizenship into Question, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americansalong-the-border-throwing-their-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd2a1991f075d5_story.html [https://perma.cc/D8AS-Q4YF]; Brandon Stahl, Minnesota Man and
Marine Vet Born in U.S. Files Legal Challenge to Passport Denial, STARTRIBUNE (May 9, 2019),
http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-man-born-in-u-s-files-legal-challenge-to-passportdenial/509719882/ [https://perma.cc/68H6-AD79]; Debbie Weingarten, My Children Were Denied
Passports Because They Were Delivered by a Midwife, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/opinion/weingarten-homebirth-border-passports.html
[https://perma.cc/9K6N-G3NG].
5. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Justice Dept. Establishes Office to Denaturalize Immigrants, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/us/politics/denaturalizationimmigrants-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/P4B8-VYBM]; Seth Freed Wessler, Is
Denaturalization the Next Front in the Trump Administration’s War on Immigration?, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/magazine/naturalized-citizenshipimmigration-trump.html [https://perma.cc/V3VC-MZNA].
6. See, e.g., Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S.
Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606 (2011).
7. Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 781–84.
8. Id. at 799–809.
9.
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
10. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 600 (1990).
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substantive constitutional provisions like the Equal Protection Clause11
and substantive administrative law standards like arbitrary and
capricious review.12
What Robertson and Manta contribute as well-informed
observers looking into the world of immigration law are their skills as
procedural experts. Their deft analysis of burden shifting and reliance
could only be provided by an experienced litigator or keen proceduralist.
Take this passage, where they leverage insider knowledge of how
burdens of proof impact removal proceedings:
When an individual subject to removal proceedings makes a claim of citizenship, the
government bears the burden of proof to establish that the individual is a noncitizen. A
majority of the U.S. courts of appeals agree that the individual can raise a claim of
citizenship at any time in the proceedings—the claim is not forfeited by failure to raise it
earlier in the proceedings nor by failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
judicial review.
The government’s burden of persuasion in such proceedings is heightened: it must
establish noncitizenship by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.” This is
unquestionably a higher standard that an individual seeking a declaratory judgment of
citizenship would have to meet. Within that standard, however, courts have applied a
complex burden-shifting scheme. Although the government bears the initial burden to
prove noncitizenship, a mere showing that the individual was born outside the United
States is sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of noncitizenship that then shifts
the burden to the person claiming citizenship. Once the burden has shifted, the individual
must then either dispute the evidence of birth abroad or show how citizenship was
obtained—perhaps through derivative status or naturalization.13

They embed their tactical analysis in reflections on core values
such as reliance liberty, stability, finality, and fairness that cut across
immigration law and bind it to universal legal norms. Or, at least, they
bind immigration law to the norms that ought to govern government
actions against individuals. Their willingness to import universal
norms is a valuable contribution to the jurisprudence of immigration
law.
The lens of due process also touches on a big and too often
overlooked idea: immigrants are part of the American political
community and have individual rights that require government
justification before they can be deprived or infringed. By design, power
flows from the citizens to the state and not the other way around. The
11. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (discussing Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944)).
12. There have been legal challenges to the reasonability of DACA, public charge rules, and
asylum changes. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, No. 18–587
(U.S. argued Nov. 12, 2019); Public Charge, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR.,
https://www.ilrc.org/public-charge [https://perma.cc/WPK2-7UU5] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020);
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Trump Can Bar Asylum Seekers While Legal Fight Continues,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/us/politics/supreme-courttrump-asylum.html [https://perma.cc/36WG-4ZTB].
13. Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 775–76.
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authors take a significant analytical step when they link immigrants’
rights with constitutional norms for citizens. Immigration advocates
have sought to make the case that immigrants and citizens exist on a
continuum for years: the rallying cry of recent social movements has
been that immigrants’ rights are civil rights. Though the specific
incidents that give rise to immigrants’ rights social movements are
multitudinous, citizenship cases are a very convincing way to make this
point.14 The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause provides for
birthright citizenship and naturalization.15 Once the threshold of
citizenship is crossed, there ought to be little contention about the
sanctity of individual rights and liberty. Save the skirmishes for the
border or other cases where political boundaries are less settled.
But in the current policy environment, nobody is safe from
immigration enforcement—not even U.S. citizens. The forces of
exclusion and enforcement extend between borders, rooting out anyone
who is not U.S.-born to U.S.-born parents. For that matter, it roots out
anyone who is not U.S.-born to a certain kind of parents whom conform
to mainstream cultural norms.
The adherence to selective citizenship and the willingness to
redraw the bounds of citizenship as part of immigration politics is a new
and an old idea.16 Some people will never belong, as suggested by the
government’s efforts to curtail birthright citizenship going back to Dred
Scott v. Sandford,17 Elks v. Wilkins,18 and U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.19
Modern legislative proposals to end birthright citizenship for children
of undocumented immigrants (derisively called “anchor babies”) and
executive actions to end birthright citizenship for legal nonimmigrants
(derisively called “birth tourism”) breathe new life into these old
debates.20 The nearly unbroken trajectory of exclusion shows that the
14. The authors cite Professor Rachel Rosenbloom’s argument that “procedural safeguards
within an adjudicatory system cannot be premised on a line that the system is itself engaged in
drawing.” Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism,
54 B.C. L. REV. 1965, 2021–22 (2013). That is, procedural safeguards cannot be offered only to
citizens because those safeguards are needed to protect the citizenship determination itself.
Procedural safeguards must apply at an earlier stage, ensuring that individuals engaged in the
legal system—whether they are known to be citizens or not—have a full and fair opportunity to
have their claims heard.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
16. Jelani Cobb, Donald Trump’s Idea of Selective Citizenship, NEW YORKER (July 29, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/29/donald-trumps-idea-of-selective-citizenship
[https://perma.cc/UGL6-E2BD].
17. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
18. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
19. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
20. A recent example of legislation to end birthright citizenship is H.R. 140 Birthright
Citizenship Act of 2019, introduced by Rep. Steve King on January 3, 2019,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/140
[https://perma.cc/8AZC-PK3W].
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laws and mores will make sure that marginalized minorities struggle
to gain citizenship. The authors are well aware of the racial history of
exclusion embedded in the Citizenship Clause.21 Their recognition of
this history of exclusion functions as an important counterweight to the
“lofty” goals of naturalized citizenship elsewhere in the citizenship
scholarship.22
Moving to core case studies of citizenship challenges in the
Article, the authors consider procedural unfairness in each of these
situations:
•

Failures to recognize citizenship—in which they discuss
challenges to passports presented at the border, despite the
birth of the individual inside the U.S. or to U.S. citizen parents,
as in the case of Mark Esqueda23 and Mary Elizabeth Elg,24
respectively.25

•

Denaturalizing citizens—in which they link the infamous
denaturalization of Emma Goldman during the red scare26 with
recent government attempts to denaturalize citizens in
Operation Janus and still-unfolding proceedings.27

President Trump has said that he wants to abolish birthright citizenship by executive order.
Patrick J. Lyons, Trump Wants to Abolish Birthright Citizenship. Can He Do That? N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 22, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/22/us/birthright-citizenship-14th-amendmenttrump.html [https://perma.cc/N8NP-ZBQA]. The Trump administration’s State Department has
instituted a policy to block visas for pregnant women to combat “birth tourism.” Temporary
Visitors for Business or Pleasure: A Rule by the State Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 4219 (Jan. 24,
2020),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/24/2020-01218/visas-temporaryvisitors-for-business-or-pleasure [https://perma.cc/BB3X-ND54].
21. See Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 765.
22.
Id. at 764 (quoting D. Carolina Núñez, Citizenship Gaps, 54 TULSA L. REV. 301, 313
(2019).
23. Stahl, supra note 4. See generally Esqueda v. Pompeo, supra note 4.
24. Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
25. Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 767–69, 771–73.
26. Id. at 761–66; Emma Goldman, A Woman Without A Country, FREE VISTAS, reprinted
in PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 187–95 (2013).
27.
Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 780. These denaturalization operations are
described in Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, (Un)Civil Denaturalization, N.Y.U. L.
REV. (2019); Amanda Frost, Alienating Citizens, 114 NW. L. REV. 241 (2019); Unmaking
Americans: Insecure Citizenship in the United States, OPEN SOC. JUST. INITIATIVE (2019),
https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/unmaking-americans
[https://perma.cc/A5FFRV9F].
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Wrongful deportations and other litigation raising various types
of tangles U.S. citizens have had with immigration
enforcement.28

All of these situations add up to a portrait of unstable
citizenship, and even more examples could be imagined.29 The
instability is similar to what I found in my interviews with green card
holders30 and what other scholars have reported from surveys of DACA
recipients, TPS holders, and other immigrants holding lesser legal
protections.31 This mounting challenge to immigration and naturalized
citizenship, the authors argue convincingly, amounts to nothing less
than a threat to democracy.32
What more could the authors do in this Article? They could
extend the scope of their focus on challenges with litigation to recognize
the large swath of unreviewable actions of executive discretion. The
insulation of immigration-related actions from courts is furthered by
the heavy use of guidance within the agency, Congress’s jurisdictionstripping statutes, and the encroachment both of the White House on
immigration agencies and of immigration agencies on one another.
They could also extend the scope of their search for remedies
beyond the Constitution. Much of immigration law is administrative
law33 and focuses on the Administrative Procedure Act rather than on
constitutional norms. The litigation over inclusion of a citizenship
question in the 2020 U.S. Census is a recent example. Only partially

28. Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 807–09; Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d
1256 (M.D. Ga. 2012); Turner v. United States, No. 4:13-CV-932, 2013 WL 5877358, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 31, 2013); see Stevens, supra note 6.
29. For example, the rising burdens on the path to citizenship are another way of making
citizenship determinations unfair. Citizenship Delayed: Civil Rights and Voting Rights
Implications of the Backlog in Citizenship and Naturalization Applications, Report of the Colorado
Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, reprinted in 91 COLO. L. REV. FORUM
(2019); Ming H. Chen, Citizenship Denied: Implications of the Naturalization Backlog for
Noncitizens in Military, 97 DENV. U.L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
30. MING H. CHEN, PURSUING CITIZENSHIP IN THE ENFORCEMENT ERA (forthcoming 2020).
31. Roberto G. Gonzales, Kristina Brant, & Benjamin Rother, DACAmented in the Age of
Deportation: Navigating Spaces of Belonging and Vulnerability in Social and Personal Lives, 43
ETHNIC & RACIAL STUDIES 60 (2019).
32. See Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 810 (“It is only by protecting citizenship
interests that constitutional democracy, which rests on the idea of political equality, can
function.”).
33.
See Jill E. Family, Online Symposium: Is Immigration Law Administrative Law?
Introduction, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 8, 2016) https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/onlinesymposium-is-immigration-law-administrative-law-introduction-by-jill-e-family/
[https://perma.cc/2VZA-G4U5] (noting “the intersections of immigration law and administrative
law”) (including contributions from Chris Walker, David Rubenstein, Shoba Wadhia, Bijal Shah,
and Michael Kagan).
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settled in the Supreme Court,34 the case leaves open questions about
how the government could properly add a question inquiring about
citizenship status and whether the Executive Order that sets
expectations for interagency cooperation and data sharing about
citizenship will prove to be unfair.35
Part III of Litigating Citizenship, on the uncertain constitutional
basis for increased procedural safeguards, attempts to build a strong
case for heightened procedure based on the “factual complexity” of
citizenship.36 The authors note some of these troublesome facts: most
citizens do not carry their birth certificates or passports; some people
do not even own these documents; and mental illnesses or poverty may
compound the inability to furnish documentary evidence of
citizenship.37 And the authors note that “ ‘some individuals may be
citizens without knowing it, due to the rules governing acquired and
derivative citizenship’—rules that have changed just within the last few
years.”38 The authors seek a larger role for equity to acknowledge the
factual complexities of citizenship.
The notion of equitable defenses would seem to be common sense
in other policy arenas. Equitable principles are called upon because
many immigration cases are intensely fact-based inquiries and
discretion ought to be available to right wrongs. But equity is not a
winning argument in immigration law and equitable discretion is
fading: tools like JRAD (Judicial Recommendation Against
Deportation), deferred action, and administrative closure are being
taken away from immigration judges.
Ultimately, immigrants are not treated like U.S. citizens under
existing law or equitable principles. They are largely unrepresented by
counsel, often do not know the charges against them, and have limited
opportunity to appeal adverse findings given the politicized nature of
the immigration courts. This does not change even when they face
criminal-like consequences such as being jailed in detention—a point
that has been made by Cesar Garcia Hernandez, Ingrid Eagley, and
34. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2567, 2576 (2019) (holding, among
other things, that the Constitution permits the Secretary of Commerce to inquire about citizenship
in a census questionnaire but invalidating the inclusion of a citizenship question in the 2020
census questionnaire because the Secretary’s stated reasons for including such a question were
mere pretext).
35. See Collecting Information About Citizenship Status in Connection with the Decennial
Census, 84 Fed. Reg. 33821 (July 11, 2019) (the Executive Order).
36.
Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 784–85 (quoting Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking
Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1824–25 (2013)).
37.
Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 785.
38.
Id. (quoting Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1825
(2013)).
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many other crimmigration scholars.39 This false hope for more robust
and equitable treatment of immigrants may not be a blind spot of the
authors so much as a blind spot in the law itself. Their faith that due
process comparable to what is offered in a criminal context could
improve the process available to immigrants is refreshing. However, it
is somewhat unrealistic given the losing battle of immigration
advocates and scholars to equate immigration-detention with criminal
practices in the current political environment.40
Still, immigrants and naturalized citizens have constitutional
rights, especially due process. The question is: how much due process?
That question goes to the heart of heightened procedural protections
owed in citizenship cases. After all, if it is only the individual’s interests
that matter, then the due process protections of ordinary civil litigation
should surely be good enough. Courts adjudicate matters such as child
custody, workers’ compensation benefits, and other civil matters that
strike at the core of individuals’ lives and concerns every day. What is
different about citizenship? The authors argue that the citizenship
difference stems from the political order enshrined in the U.S.
Constitution.41 I find this to be the most compelling part of their
argument. A court’s concern is not whether a particular person is
exercising any particular rights of free speech, political association, or
exercise of religion; its concern is the potential chilling effect on other
people if litigation procedure leaves citizenship protections vulnerable.
Recalling Afroyim v. Rusk, the case forbidding involuntary
expatriation other than for fraud or illegal procurement of citizenship,
the Court discussed the close ties between democracy and citizenship.42
Justice Black writing for the majority said, “The very nature of our free
government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law
under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive

39. See Cesar Garcia Hernandez, Desconstructing Crimmigration, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
197, 229 (2018) (“Roughly two-thirds of migrants in removal proceedings go without an attorney;
for detained migrants, the overwhelming majority do not have access to a lawyer.”); see also
Jennifer Chacon, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 613, 651 (2012)
(“In criminal courts along the southern border, illegal entry pleas are counseled only nominally,
with six to ten defendants pleading at a time with the assistance of one public defender.”); Juliet
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
367, 393 (2006) (“Noncitizens in immigration proceedings . . . generally do not have the right to
appointed counsel at government expense . . . .”).
40. See, e.g., Ingrid Eagley, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L. J. 2282, 2286 (2013) (arguing
that “[i]n th[e] . . . half century after Gideon [v. Wainwright], the once-separate domains of
criminal law and immigration law have merged”).
41. Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 793–99.
42. 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967); see also Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 779–80; 794–97
(discussing the impact of Afroyim).
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another group of citizens of their citizenship.”43 For this reason, the
authors prescribe that “[p]rotecting citizenship . . . means rethinking
litigation procedures” to ensure that they offer protection
commensurate with the interests at stake in those suits and that reflect
the seriousness of liberty and reliance interests involved in citizenship
challenges.44 This seems right, and it argues against an anomaly in
constitutional law: citizenship is subordinated, rather than elevated, to
merit increased attention from the courts45—and ultimately, the
authors persuade, from all of us.

43. Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 268.
44. Robertson & Manta, supra note 1, at 810.
45. Ming H. Chen, Alienated: A Reworking of the Racialization Thesis After September 11,
18 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 411, 434 (2010) (“[U]nder constitutional law . . . lower levels of
scrutiny are applied to judicial review of alien (noncitizen), as opposed to citizen, discrimination
claims.”).

